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Abstract—Witness functions have recently been introduced in
cryptographic protocols’ literature as a new powerful way to
prove protocol correctness with respect to secrecy. In this paper,
we extend them to the property of authentication. We show how
to use them safely and we run an analysis on a modified version
of the Woo-Lam protocol. We show that it is correct with respect
to authentication.
Index Terms—Analysis, authentication, proof, protocols, wit-
ness functions, Woo-Lam protocol modified version.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic protocols are distributed programs used ev-
erywhere. They are designed to provide security assurances in
communications by using cryptographic primitives. Traditional
assurances include secrecy, integrity and authentication, and
more recently, anonymity, atomicity, verifiability, coercion-
resistance, etc. It has been clear for a long time that crypto-
graphic protocols are prone to serious design drifts. Therefore,
several formalisms [1] have been proposed to check protocols
against flaws and vulnerabilities. In this paper, we focus on
authentication. Authentication is the property that should be
satisfied by a protocol to be secure against acceptance of a
fraudulent agent by ensuring that one party is who he claims
to be. A protocol can reach authentication by means of secrecy
when it succeeds to provide evidence to one party that the
second party manages to present a piece of data that could
only have been generated by him (e.g. response to a challenge).
This implies, very often, that some data can be unequivocally
traced back to its origin. In some scenarios, authentication
involves more than two parties where a trusted server could
be used to introduce one party B to another party A and A is
assured that B is trusted by the server in the required protocol
semantics. It is worth mentioning that, of course, protocols can
reach authentication with no need to secrecy, however, these
protocols are not our target in this paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
Our way to prove that a protocol is correct with respect to
authentication consists in reaching two intermediate purposes:
1) we prove that the secret used for authentication is never
disclosed to avoid any bad use of this latter by an
opponent;
2) we make sure that the link between the authenticatee
identity and the secret is never untied. This is to guarantee
that the secret emanates from the right origin.
For that, we use the theory of witness functions [2]–[5].
Witness functions adequately estimate the level of security of
each atomic message. Before this paper, we used to use them
to prove secrecy in a protocol by showing that it is increasing.
That is to say, to show that the level of security of every single
atomic message exchanged in the protocol is always growing
and never goes down between any two consecutive steps of
receiving and sending. Our contribution here is the extension of
witness functions for the authentication property. For that, we
give sufficient conditions for authentication based on the two
mighty bounds of a witness function such, if met, the protocol
is automatically declared correct with respect to authentication.
• in Sections III and IV, we’ll give a brief summary of
the proof of correctness of increasing protocols when
analyzed with safe functions and we give a guideline to
build these functions;
• in Section V, we’ll give a short overview on witness
functions and we bring out their powerful bounds;
• in Section VI, we’ll give sufficient conditions to ensure
protocols’ correctness with respect to authentication based
on witness functions;
• in Section VII, we’ll analyze a modified version of the
Woo-Lam protocol;
• finally, we’ll compare our approach with similar ones and
conclude.
Please notice that all the notations we will use in this paper
are given in the appendix. The reader is kindly requested to
see them before moving forward.
III. ON THE CORRECTNESS OF INCREASING PROTOCOLS
Hereafter, we remind an important result: ”A protocol keeps
its secret inputs when analyzed with a safe function and shown
increasing”.
A. Safe functions
Definition 1: (Well-formed Function) Let F be a function
and C be a context of verification. F is C-well-formed iff:
∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈ A(M):
F (α, {α}) = ⊥
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
A well-formed function F must return the infimum to an
atom α that appears clear in M to say that any participant
knows it from M . It returns to an atom in the union of two
sets, the minimum of the two values calculated in each set
separately. It returns the supremum to any atom α that does
not appear in M to say that nobody could get it from M .
Definition 2: (Full-Invariant-by-Opponent Function) Let
F be a function and C be a context of verification. F is full-
invariant-by-Opponent iff: ∀M ⊆M,m ∈M, α ∈ A(m):
M |=C m⇒ (F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
A full-invariant-by-opponent function F is such, when it
affects a security level to an atom α in a set of messages
M , the opponent cannot deduce from this set some message
m in which this level decreases (i.e. F (α,m) 6⊒ F (α,M)),
unless he is expressly entitled to know it (i.e. pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
A function F is s said to be safe if it is well-formed and
full-invariant-by-Opponent.
Definition 3: (F -Increasing Protocol) Let F be a function
and C be a context of verification and p be a protocol.
p is F -increasing iff: ∀R.r ∈ RG(p), σ ∈ Γ, α ∈
A(r+), we have: F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ)
An F -increasing protocol must produce traces with atomic
messages having always a security level, returned by F ,
higher when sending (i.e. in r+σ) than when receiving (i.e.
in R−σ) or than its level set in the context (i.e. pαq), if known.
Theorem 1: (Sececy in Increasing Protocols) Let F be a
safe function and p be an F -increasing protocol.
p keeps its secret inputs.
Theorem 1 states that a protocol keeps its secret inputs when
it is analyzed by a safe function F and is shown increasing.
This result is quite intuitive. In fact, if the opponent succeeds
to obtain a secret α (clear) from the protocol then its security
level given by F is the infimum since F is well-formed. That
cannot be due to the rules of the protocol since this latter is
F -increasing. That could not arise neither when the opponent
uses his capabilities since F is full-invariant-by-opponent. So,
the secret is kept forever. The detailed proof is available in [5].
IV. GUIDELINE FOR BUILDING SAFE FUNCTIONS
In [4] we propose a class of safe selections: SEKGen. Any
selection S in SEKGen must return to an atom α in a message
m:
1) if α is encrypted by a key k such that k is the outer key
that satisfies the condition pk−1q ⊒ pαq (we refer to it
by the external protective key), a subset among k−1 and
the neighbors of α under the same protection by k;
2) for two messages linked by a function f in Σ other than
an encryption by a protective key (e.g. pair), the union of
two subselections in these two messages.
3) if α does not have a protective key in m, the infimum (all
atoms);
4) if α does not appear in m, the supremum (the empty set);
Among the selections of SEKGen, we spotlight three practical
ones:
1) the selection SEKMAX : it returns to an atom α in a message
m encrypted by the external protective key k, all the
principal identities inside the same protection by k, in
addition to k−1;
2) the selection SEKEK : it returns to an atom α in a message
m encrypted by the external protective key k, the key
k−1;
3) the selection SEKN : it returns to an atom α in a message
m encrypted by the key external protective key k, all the
principal identities inside the same protection by k;
Any selection S in SEKGen when composed to a adequate
homomorphism ψ returns a safe function F = ψ ◦ S. We
choose the homomorphism that returns for:
1) an agent, its identity;
2) the key k−1, if selected, the set of agent identities that
are authorized to know it.
We denote by FEKMAX , F
EK
EK and F
EK
N respectively the func-
tions resulting from the compositions ψ ◦SEKMAX , ψ ◦S
EK
EK and
ψ ◦ SEKN . We prove [4] that these functions are safe. In fact,
since the selection for any atom α is performed in an invariant
section protected by the external protective key k, then, to alter
this section (to decrease the security level of α), the opponent
must have priorly obtained the atomic key k−1. At this point
of the proof, his knowledge must satisfy: pK(I)q ⊒ pk−1q.
Since the key k−1 satisfies: pk−1q ⊒ pαq then the knowledge
of the opponent must satisfy pK(I)q ⊒ pαq too seeing that
the comparator ”⊒” is transitive. This is simply the definition
of a full-invariant-by-opponent function. These functions are
well-formed by construction, too.
Example 1:
Context: pαq = {A,B, S}; m = {C.{α.D}kas}kab ; k
−1
ab =
kab, k
−1
as = kas; pkasq = {A,S}, pkabq = {A,B}. We have:
SEKMAX(α,m) = {C,D, k
−1
ab } and F
EK
MAX(α,m) = ψ ◦
SEKMAX(α,m) = {C,D}∪pk
−1
ab q = {C,D} ∪ {A,B} =
{A,B,C,D}.
V. WITNESS FUNCTIONS TO ELIMINATE THE EFFECT OF
VARIABLES
The functions F ∈ {FEKMAX , F
EK
EK , F
EK
N } we have defined
so far are not useful in practice since they operate on ground
terms only. However, a static analysis should be run over
messages of the generalized roles resulting from writing the
protocol in a role-based specification [18]. These messages
contain variables that denote a content that an agent ignores
and on which he cannot perform any verification. We give
here a safe way to deal with variables. But now, let us
introduce derivation in Definition 4.
Definition 4: [Derivation]
∂Xα = α
∂XX = ǫ
∂XY = Y,X 6= Y
∂[X]m = ∂{Xm\{X}}m
∂Xf(m) = f(∂Xm), f ∈ Σ
∂S1∪S2m = ∂S1∂S2m
Derivation simply eliminates variables from a message
except a variable under evaluation. The expression ∂m denotes
a message m after removing all variables in. The aim of
derivation is to deprive variables from playing any role when
evaluating an atom in a message. The idea is hence to apply
F on the derivative message instead of the message itself.
Besides, any variable is evaluated as a block with no regard to
its content (i.e quantified). In fact, the reason why we do not
care about the content of a variable is that if a variable, globally
evaluated, is shown increasing that means that it cannot be
discovered by any unauthorized party, and consequently any
content inside cannot be discovered by an unauthorized party,
too. If it is not increasing, then the protocol will not satisfy
our sufficient conditions and hence no decision with respect to
secrecy is made on, thus, with respect to authentication, too.
This way of treating variables allows us to give any content of
a variable (dynamically known) the same value of the variable
itself (statically calculable). The way we evaluate an atom from
within a derivative message is described by Definition 5.
Definition 5:
Let m ∈MGp , X ∈ Xm and mσ be a valid trace.
For all α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, we denote by:
F (α, ∂[α]mσ) =


F (α, ∂m) if α ∈ A(∂m),
F (X, ∂[X]m) if α /∈ A(∂m)
and α = Xσ.
Since the expression F (α, ∂[α]mσ) does not depend on
substitution (i.e the run σ), we denote it simply by F ′(α,m).
Although the derivative function F ′ allows us to neutralize
variables, which is as such an important intermediate result,
using it as is to analyze protocols is not safe because it is
not even a function in the protocol. In fact, when we want
to evaluate the security level of α in the trace {α.A.B}kcd
for example, we must return to the generalized roles to see
from which message (with variables) this trace is generated
and we may realize that more than one message are able to
generate it. For instance, the messages m1 = {α.A.X}kcd and
m2 = {α.Y.B}kcd are both candidates to generate the trace
{α.A.B}kcd (i.e. possible sources of it). If we refer to the first
source (i.e. to m1), the security level of α returned by F
′ (with
F = FEKMAX ) is:
F ′(α, {α.A.X}kcd) = F (α, {α.A}kcd) = {A,C,D}
Whereas, if we refer to the second source (i.e. to m2), its
security level is:
F ′(α, {α.Y.B}kcd) = F (α, {α.B}kcd) = {B,C,D}
Therefore, we cannot rely on F ′ to analyze a protocol. To
overcome this insufficiency, we define the witness functions.
A witness function looks for all the sources of a ground
term mσ in the finite set MGp , applies F
′ to all of them,
and returns the minimum. This minimum must satisfy both
existence and uniqueness in the security lattice. Since a secret
is always evaluated under the protection of a protective key,
the research of the sources of a closed message inMGp is then
restricted to encryption patterns. We denote by M˜Gp the set
of all encryption patterns generated by the protocol (renamed).
Definition 6: [witness function] Let m ∈ MGp , X ∈ Xm
and mσ be a valid trace. Let p be a protocol and F be a
safe function. We define a witness function Wp,F for all α ∈
A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, as follows:
Wp,F (α,mσ) = ⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ}
F ′(α,m′σ′)
Using a witness function as is to analyze a protocol is a
very tedious process since we cannot enumerate all the valid
traces mσ and their sources statically. For that we bind it into
two bounds that do not depend on substitution (i.e on σ). The
upper bound of a witness function returns a minimum set of
confirmed principal identities for any α in m whereas the
lower bound returns the set of all principal identities from all
the possible sources of m (that are unifiable with it) including
the odd ones. The lower bound hunts so any odd principal
identity and interprets it as an attack. The proof is simple
since we have always {(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = mσ} ⊆
{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = mσ′} in the security lattice
whatever σ. This is expressed by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: [binding a witness function] Let m ∈ MGp .
Let Wp,F be a witness function. For all σ ∈ Γ we have:
F ′(α,m) ⊒ Wp,F (α,mσ) ⊒ ⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′)
VI. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR AUTHENTICATION
(CONTRIBUTION)
The Lemma 1 declares a decision criterion for secrecy
based on the bounds of a witness function. The upper bound
returns the set of original and trusted identities only from
the received message. The lower bound returns the set of
all the identities including those that could be inserted by a
masquerader by substituting a regular message when sent.
The criterion makes sure that no odd identity could be
inserted in the evaluation neighborhood of a given atom in
the sent message. The proof of Lemma 1 results directly from
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: [Decision for Secrecy] Let p be a protocol. Let
Wp,F be a witness function. p is correct with respect to secrecy
if: ∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀α ∈ A(r
+) we have:
⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=r+σ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F ′(α,R−)
Theorem 2 forwards two conditions such, if met, a protocol
is automatically declared correct for authentication. The first
one ensures that the protocol does not disclose its secret
inputs. An immediate outcome of this first result is that the
message the verifier last receives for authentication is in a
safe state and had not been subverted by a masquerader.
The second one makes sure that the binding between the
challenge and the identity of the identifier is not broken.
Therefore, we call once again the upper bound of the
witness function to confirm the originality of the claimer
identity by evaluating the challenge in the message that
should authenticate the claimer to the verifier. The second
clause of the second condition is trivial and introduced just
to make sure that the challenge is not received in a public state.
Theorem 2: [Decision for Authentication] Let p be a proto-
col. Let Wp,F be a witness function. p is correct with respect
to authentication if:
1) Lemma 1 is satisfied;
2) Let α be the challenge in a message m received by a
verifier B to authenticate an agent A. We have:
A ∈ F ′(α,m) ∧ F ′(α,m) ⊐ ⊥
It is worth mentioning that:
• the conditions set by Theorem 2 can be verified statically
as they use the two bounds of a witness function only
and both of them are statically determinable;
• their verification is linear under the assumption of perfect
encryption since the most costly operation is unification
in the lower bound of a witness function which is linear
under that assumption. However, under nonempty equa-
tional theories, it will vary from one to another. In a future
work, we will give new results related to this question.
VII. ANALYSIS OF A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE
WOO-LAM PROTOCOL WITH A WITNESS FUNCTION FOR
AUTHENTICATION (CONTRIBUTION)
The original version of the Woo-Lam protocol has been
proven incorrect by several means [6]–[8]. Hereafter, we
analyze an modified version of this protocol with a witness
function and we prove that it is correct with respect to
authentication. This version is denoted by p in Table I.
TABLE I
THE WOO-LAM PROTOCOL (MODIFIED VERSION)
p := 〈1, A→ B : A〉.
〈2, B → A : Nb〉.
〈3, A→ B : {B.kab}kas〉.
〈4, B → S : {A.Nb.{B.kab}kas}kbs〉.
〈5, S → B : {Nb.{A.kab}kbs}kbs 〉
The role-based specification of p is RG(p) =
{A1G, A
2
G, B
1
G, B
2
G, B
3
G, S
1
G}, where the generalized
roles A1G, A
2
G of A are as follows:
A1G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : A〉
A2G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : A〉.
〈i.2, I(B) → A : X〉.
〈i.3, A → I(B) : {B.kiab}kas〉
The generalized roles B1G, B
2
G, B
3
G of B are as follows:
B1G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : N ib〉
B2G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : N ib〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : Y 〉.
〈i.4, B → I(S) : {A.N ib.Y }kbs〉
B3G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : A〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : N ib〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : Y 〉.
〈i.4, B → I(S) : {A.N ib.Y }kbs〉.
〈i.5, I(S) → B : {N ib.{A.Z}kbs}kbs〉
The generalized role S1G of S is as follows:
S1G = 〈i.4, I(B) → S : {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs〉.
〈i.5, S → I(B) : {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs〉
Let us have a context of verification such that:
pkasq = {A,S}; pkbsq = {B,S}; pk
i
abq = {A,B, S};
pN ibq = ⊥; ∀A ∈ I, pAq = ⊥.
Let F = FEKMAX ; Wp,F =Wp,FEKMAX ;
We denote by Υp,F (α,m) the lower bound
⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) of the witness function
Wp,F (α,m).
The set of messages generated by p is
MGp = {A1, X1, {B1.K
i
A2B1
}KA2S1 , A3, N
i
B2
, Y1,
{A4.N
i
B3
.Y2}KB3S2 , {N
i
B4
.{A5.Z1}KB4S3}KB4S3 ,
{A6.U1.{B5.V1}KA6S4 }KB5S4 , {U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5 }KB6S5 }
The variables are denoted by X1, Y2, Z1, U1, U2, V1 and V2;
After eliminating duplicates in MGp and the messages that
are not encryption patterns, we have:
M˜Gp = {{B1.K
i
A2B1
}KA2S1 , {A4.N
i
B3
.Y2}KB3S2 ,
{N iB4 .{A5.Z1}KB4S3}KB4S3 , {A6.U1.{B5.V1}KA6S4}KB5S4 ,
{U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5}
A. Analysis of the Generalized Roles of A
According to the generalized role of A, an agent A may take
part in some session Si in which he receives an unkown mes-
sage X and sends the message {B.kiab}kas . This is described
by the following rule:
Si :
X
{B.kiab}kas
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in Si:
1- For kiab:
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= X (when receiving, we use the
upper bound)
F ′(kiab, R
−
Si
) = F (kiab, ∂[k
i
ab]X) = F (k
i
ab, ǫ) = ⊤ (1)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {B.kiab}kas (when sending , we use
the lower bound)
∀kiab.{(m
′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀kiab.{(m
′σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = {B.kiab}kasσ
′}
= {({B1.K
i
A2B1
}KA2S1 , σ
′
1)} such that:
σ′1 = {B1 7−→ B,K
i
A2B1
7−→ kiab,KA2S1 7−→ kas}
Υp,F (k
i
ab, {B.k
i
ab}kas)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the witness function}
F ′(kiab, {B1.K
i
A2B1
}KA2S1σ
′
1)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F ′(kiab, {B.k
i
ab}kasσ
′
1)
= {Definition 5}
F (kiab, ∂[k
i
ab]{B.k
i
ab}kas)
= {Derivation in Definition 4}
F (kiab, {B.k
i
ab}kas)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{B,A, S}
Then, we have:
Υp,F (k
i
ab, {B.k
i
ab}kas) = {B,A, S} (2)
2- Conformity with Lemma 1:
From (1) and (2) and since pkiabq = {B,A, S} in the
context, we have:
Υp,F (k
i
ab, {B.k
i
ab}kas) ⊒ pk
i
abq ⊓ F
′(kiab, X) (3)
Then, the generalized role of A respects Lemma 1. (I)
B. Analysis of the generalized roles of B
According to the generalized role of B, an agentB may take
part in two subsequent sessions: Si and Sj such that j > i.
In the first session Si, the agent B receives the identity A
and sends the nonce N ib . In the second one S
j , he receives an
unknown message Y and he sends the message {A.N ib .Y }kbs .
This is described by the following rules:
Si :
A
N ib
Sj :
Y
{A.N ib.Y }kbs
B.1- Analysis of the messages exchanged in Si:
1- For N ib :
Since N ib is set public in the context (i.e. pN
i
bq = ⊥), then,
we have directly:
Υp,F (N
i
b, N
i
b) ⊒ pN
i
bq ⊓ F
′(N ib , A) (4)
B.2- Analysis of the messages exchanged in Sj :
1- For N ib :
Since N ib is set public in the context (i.e. pN
i
bq = ⊥), then,
we have directly:
Υp,F (N
i
b, {A.N
i
b.Y }kbs) ⊒ pN
i
bq ⊓ F
′(N ib , Y ) (5)
2- ∀Y :
Since when receiving, we have:
F ′(Y, Y ) = F (Y, ∂[Y ]Y ) = F (Y, Y ) = ⊥
Then, we have directly:
Υp,F (Y, {A.N
i
b .Y }kbs) ⊒ pY q ⊓ F
′(Y, Y ) (6)
3- Conformity with Lemma 1:
From (4), (5) and (6), we have: the generalized role of
B respects Lemma 1. (II)
C. Analysis of the generalized roles of S
According to the generalized role of S, an agent S may
take part in some session Si in which he receives the message
{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs and sends the message {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs .
This is described by the following rule:
Si :
{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs
{U.{A.V }kbs}kbs
1- ∀U :
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs (when re-
ceiving, we use the upper bound)
F ′(U, {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs) = F (U, ∂[U ]{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs)
= F (U, {A.U.{B}kas}kbs)
= {A,B, S}
(7)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs (when sending ,
we use the lower bound)
∀U.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀U.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = {U.{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′}
= {({{U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5 }KB6S5 , σ
′
1)} such that:
σ′1 = {U2 7−→ U,A7 7−→ A, V2 7−→ V,KB6S5 7−→ kbs}
Υp,F (U, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the witness function}
F ′(U, {U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5 }KB6S5σ
′
1)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F ′(U, {U2.{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′
1)
= {Definition 5}
F (U2, ∂[U2]{U2.{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Derivation in Definition 4}
F (U2, {U2.{A}kbs}kbs)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{A,B, S}
Then, we have:
Υp,F (U, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs) = {A,B, S} (8)
2- ∀V :
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs (when
receiving, we use the upper bound)
F ′(V, {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs) =F (V, ∂[V ]{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs)
= F (V, {A.{B.V }kas}kbs)
= F (V, ∂[V ]{A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs)
= F (V, {A.{B.V }kas}kbs)
=


{A,B, S} if kas is the external protective key of V in
the received message {A.{B.V }kas}kbs
{A,B, S} if kbs is the external protective key of V in
the received message {A.{B.V }kas}kbs
= {A,B, S}
Then, we have:
F ′(V, {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs) = {A,B, S} (9)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs (when sending ,
we use the lower bound)
∀V.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀V.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = {U.{A.V }kbs}kbsσ
′}
= {({{U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5 , σ
′
1),
({N iB4 .{A5.Z1}KB4S3}KB4S3 , σ
′
2)} such that:
{
σ′1 = {U2 7−→ U,A7 7−→ A, V2 7−→ V,KB6S5 7−→ kbs}
σ′2 = {U 7−→ N
i
B4
, A5 7−→ A,Z1 7−→ V,KB4S3 7−→ kbs}
Υp,F (V, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the witness function}
F ′(V, {U2.{A7.V2}KB6S5}KB6S5σ
′
1)
⊓
F ′(V, {N iB4 .{A5.Z1}KB4S3}KB4S3σ
′
2)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F ′(V, {U.{A.V2}kbs}kbsσ
′
1) ⊓ F
′(V, {N ib.{A.V2}kbs}kbsσ
′
2)
= {Definition 5}
F (V2, ∂[V2]{U.{A.V2}kbs}kbs)⊓F (V2, ∂[V2]{N
i
b.{A.V2}kbs}kbs)
= {Derivation in Definition 4}
F (V2, {{A.V2}kbs}kbs) ⊓ F (V2, {N
i
b.{A.V2}kbs}kbs)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{A,B, S}
Then, we have:
Υp,F (V, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs) = {A,B, S} (10)
3- Conformity with Lemma 1:
From (7) and (8), we have:
Υp,F (U, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs) ⊒ pUq⊓F
′(U, {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs)
(11)
From (9) and (10), we have:
Υp,F (V, {U.{A.V }kbs}kbs) ⊒ pV q⊓F
′(V, {A.U.{B.V }kas}kbs
(12)
From (11) and (12), we have: the generalized role of S
respects Lemma 1. (III)
From (I) and (II) and (III), we conclude that: p respects
Lemma 1. (IV)
Now that the first condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied
(i.e. the protocol is proven increasing, so correct for secrecy),
let us examine the second one. Indeed, the message received by
the authenticator B to authenticatee A is {N ib.{A.Z}kbs}kbs .
The challenge to be verified by B is the nonce N ib . We have:
F ′(N ib, {N
i
b.{A.Z}kbs}kbs = F (N
i
b , ∂[N
i
b]{N
i
b.{A.Z}kbs}kbs
= F (N ib , {N
i
b.{A}kbs}kbs)
= {A,B, S}
Then, we can easily see that:
A ∈ F ′(N ib, {N
i
b.{A.Z}kbs}kbs)
∧
F ′(N ib , {N
i
b.{A.Z}kbs}kbs) ⊐ ⊥ (V)
From (IV) and (V) and Theorem 2, we can declare now, and
only now, that: The modified version of the Woo-Lam protocol
is correct with respect to authentication.
VIII. COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR WORKS
In the witness functions logic, to prove authentication,
a protocol must be verified for secrecy first. For that, the
upper bound of a witness function bases its calculation on
safe identities collected from a piece of message that is fully
invariant by opponent in order to deprives this latter from
using his capabilities to forge these identities. Besides, in every
single sending step of the protocol, the lower bound makes
sure that the protocol does not endow the opponent of new
rules that could mislead a regular agent by using suspicious
messages that ’’look like” a regular one but, in fact, have
been gathered from previous sessions. To do so, this bound
considers all encryption patterns that might be sources of a
final trace and verifies whether or not a suspicious identity
could be inseminated in some variable when the protocol
is running. If this is the case, the analysis is immediately
aborted and no result for the protocol correctness is given
with respect to secrecy. This way we treat secrecy leads to an
interesting observation: ”If a protocol is correct for secrecy,
then any atomic messages arrives to its destination in a safe
state”. That means that its evaluation environment, based on a
protective key and all the identities beyond, does not contain
any suspicious identity. All of them are reliable. It turns out
that the authenticator has just to make sure that the identity of
the authenticatee is present, witnessing finally the origin of the
authenticating message. This is made available by the upper
bound that is called, once again, to provide this authentication
service, too. In literature, we can point out an interesting work
which is similar in some aspects to ours. It is the work of
Houmani published in [9]–[12]. In this work, she defined
two functions to estimate the level of security of atoms in
messages called respectively DEK and DEKAN. The DEK
function is based on the direct key only whereas DEKAN is
based on the direct key and neighbors. The DEK function is
very limited in practice. However, the main drawback of the
DEKAN function is that it is not variable free. For instance,
DEKAN(α, {α.A.X}kbs) = {A, ,B, S} ⊓ pXq, where X is
a variable having an unknown level of security pXq in the
context. The fact that a function has outputs with variables sets
up a real barrier when comparing two security levels, especially
when we have more than one variable in the same message.
As a result, very few protocols have been shown correct with
respect to secrecy and, as far as we know, no further researches
have been published with respect to authentication, very likely
because of variables in output. With witness functions, we do
not have this problem owing to derivation used in the witness
functions’ bounds that eliminate variables in output. Hence,
the comparison between security levels is made possible and
easier. Several tools have been proposed in the state-of-the-art
of cryptographic protocols to verify authentication in security
protocols. Among them, we can cite an interesting one: the
AVISPA tool [13]. This tool consists of an aggregation of
three model checkers and a tree automata verifier. These four
components are:
• the Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher: applies con-
straint solving to run both protocol falsification and
verification for bounded sessions;
• the On-the-fly Model-Checker: it carries out a protocol
verification by exploring the transition system. It consid-
ers both typed and untyped protocol models;
• the SAT-based Model-Checker: it uses typed protocols
and carries out bounded session verification by calling
a SAT solvers to reduce problem input;
• the TA4SP: is a tree automata that carries out unbounded
protocol verification by estimating the opponent
knowledge using rewriting techniques.
The AVISPA tool was successful in finding new attacks, for
instance, on the ISO-PK3 protocol and the IKEv2 protocol with
digital signatures (a man-in-the-middle attack). However, the
main drawback of model checkers remains the state explosion
problem that we do not face using our approach. Another
interesting tool is the ProVerif one [14], [15]. This latter uses
an abstract representation of a protocol by Horn clauses and
supports several cryptographic primitives described by rewrite
rules or equations. The main limitation of this kind of verifiers
is the halting problem where a program could never end.
That is why binding sessions becomes usually a must. In our
approach, we are not concerned about this problem since our
approach is fully static.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we strongly believe that we are giving
a new analytic direction for protocols’ verification against
authentication flaws by using our recent finding: the witness
functions. In a future work, we will experiment our approach
on more protocols in order to know how wide is the range of
protocols that could be analyzed with it and how reasonable
is the rate of false negatives. A special attention will be paid
to protocols that do not run in isolation in order to prevent
multi-protocol attacks [16], [17]. Finally, anonymity is one of
our immediate targets. In fact, this property seems to be the
opposite of authentication in the sense that the link between
the sender identity and the secret must be shown broken during
the communication to make sure that an opponent cannot
reconstruct it. This is a major concern in e-voting protocols, for
example. In theory, witness functions should be useful to prove
this property by setting sufficient conditions for anonymity.
REFERENCES
[1] V. Cortier and S. Kremer, “Formal models and techniques for analyzing
security protocols: A tutorial,” Foundations and Trends in Programming
Languages, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 151–267, 2014.
[2] J. Fattahi, Analyse des Protocoles Cryptographiques par les Fonctions
Te´moins. PhD thesis, Universite´ Laval. Que´bec. Canada, February 2016.
[3] J. Fattahi, M. Mejri, and E. Pricop, “The theory of witness functions,”
in Recent Advances in Systems Safety and Security (E. Pricop and
G. Stamatescu, eds.), ch. 1, pp. 1–20, Switzerland: Springer International
Publishing (in press), June 2016.
[4] J. Fattahi, M. Mejri, and H. Houmani, “Secrecy by witness functions,”
in the 5th Proceedings of the Formal Methods for Security FMS’2014
Workshop co-located with the PetriNets-2014 Conference, Tunis, Tunisia
(V. Cortier and R. Robbana, eds.), pp. 34–52, CEUR, June 2014.
[5] J. Fattahi, M. Mejri, and H. Houmani, “Relaxed Conditions for Secrecy
in a Role-Based Specification,” International Journal of Information
Security, vol. 1, pp. 33–36, July 2014.
[6] M. Mejri, “Chaotic protocols,” in Computational Science and Its Ap-
plications - ICCSA 2004, International Conference, Assisi, Italy, May
14-17, 2004, Proceedings, Part I, pp. 938–948, 2004.
[7] S. A. Shaikh and V. J. Bush, “Analysing the woo-lam protocol using csp
and rank functions,” in WOSIS, pp. 3–12, 2005.
[8] A. Armando, D. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna, J. Cuel-
lar, P. Hankes Drielsma, P.-C. Hea´m, J. Mantovani, S. Mo¨dersheim,
D. von Oheimb, M. Rusinowitch, J. Santiago, M. Turuani, L. Vigano`,
and L. Vigneron, “The AVISPA Tool for the Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocols and Applications,” in Proceedings of the
17th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV’05)
(K. Etessami and S. K. Rajamani, eds.), vol. 3576 of LNCS, Springer,
2005. Available at http://www.avispa-project.org/publications.html.
[9] H. Houmani and M. Mejri, “Practical and universal interpretation func-
tions for secrecy,” in SECRYPT, pp. 157–164, 2007.
[10] H. Houmani and M. Mejri, “Ensuring the correctness of cryptographic
protocols with respect to secrecy,” in SECRYPT, pp. 184–189, 2008.
[11] H. Houmani and M. Mejri, “Formal analysis of set and nsl protocols
using the interpretation functions-based method,” Journal Comp. Netw.
and Communic., vol. 2012, 2012.
[12] H. Houmani, M. Mejri, and H. Fujita, “Secrecy of cryptographic pro-
tocols under equational theory,” Knowl.-Based Syst., vol. 22, no. 3,
pp. 160–173, 2009.
[13] L. Vigano`, “Automated security protocol analysis with the {AVISPA}
tool,” Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 155, pp. 61
– 86, 2006. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on Mathemat-
ical Foundations of Programming Semantics (MFPS XXI)Mathematical
Foundations of Programming Semantics {XXI}.
[14] V. Cheval and B. Blanchet, “Proving more observational equivalences
with ProVerif,” in 2nd Conference on Principles of Security and Trust
(POST 2013) (D. Basin and J. Mitchell, eds.), vol. 7796 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, (Rome, Italy), pp. 226–246, Springer, Mar. 2013.
[15] B. Blanchet, “Using Horn clauses for analyzing security protocols,”
in Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols
(V. Cortier and S. Kremer, eds.), vol. 5 of Cryptology and Information
Security Series, pp. 86–111, IOS Press, Mar. 2011.
[16] M. Arapinis, V. Cheval, and S. Delaune, “Composing security protocols:
From confidentiality to privacy,” in Principles of Security and Trust -
4th International Conference, POST 2015, Held as Part of the European
Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2015,
London, UK, April 11-18, 2015, Proceedings, pp. 324–343, 2015.
[17] C. Cremers and S. Mauw, Operational Semantics and Verification of
Security Protocols, ch. Multi-protocol Attacks, pp. 107–122. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[18] M. Debbabi, Y. Legare´, and M. Mejri, “An environment for the specifi-
cation and analysis of cryptoprotocols,” in ACSAC, pp. 321–332, 1998.
[19] D. Dolev and A. C.-C. Yao, “On the security of public key protocols,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 198–207,
1983.
APPENDIX: NOTATIONS
+ We denote by C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,L⊒, p.q〉 the context of verification
containing the parameters that affect the analysis of a protocol:
• M: is a set of messages built from the algebraic signature 〈N ,Σ〉
where N is a set of atomic names (nonces, keys, principals,
etc.) and Σ is a set of functions (enc:: encryption, dec:: de-
cryption, pair:: concatenation (denoted by ”.” ), etc.). i.e. M =
T〈N ,Σ〉(X ). We use Γ to denote the set of all substitution from
X → M. We denote by A all atomic messages (atoms) in M,
by A(m) the set of atomic messages in m and by I the set of
principals including the opponent I . We denote by k−1 the reverse
form of a key k and we assume that (k−1)−1 = k.
• ξ: is the theory that describes the algebraic properties of the
functions in Σ by equations (e.g. dec(enc(x, y), y−1) = x).
• |=: is the inference system of the opponent under the theory. Let
M be a set of messages and m a message.M |=m means that the
opponent can infer m from M using his capabilities. We extend
this notation to traces as follows: ρ |= m means that the opponent
can infer m from the trace ρ.
• K : is a function from I to M, that assigns to any principal a set
of atomic messages describing his initial knowledge. We denote
by KC(I) the initial knowledge of the opponent, or simply K(I)
where the context of verification is obvious.
• L⊒ : is the security lattice (L,⊒,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) used to assign
security values to messages. A concrete example of a lattice is
(2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I,∅) that will be used in this paper.
• p.q : is a partial function that assigns a value of security (type)
to a message in M. Let M be a set of messages and m a single
message. We write pMq ⊒ pmq when ∃m′ ∈M.pm′q ⊒ pmq
+ Let p be a protocol, we denote by RG(p) the set of the generalized roles
extracted from p. A generalized role is an abstraction of the protocol
where the emphasis is put on a specific principal and all the unknown
messages are replaced by variables. More details about the role-based
specification could be found in [18]. We denote by MGp the set of
messages generated by RG(p), by Mp the set of closed messages
(ground terms) generated by substitution in terms in MGp . We denote
by R− (respectively R+) the set of received messages (respectively
sent messages) by a principal in the role R. Conventionally, we use
uppercases for sets or sequences and lowercases for single elements.
For example M denotes a set of messages, m a message, R a role
composed of sequence of steps, r a step and R.r the role ending by
the step r. A valid trace is a ground term obtained by substitution in
the generalized roles. We assume that the opponent has the full-control
of the net and is able to defeat any operation f in Σ except encryption
if he does not have the decryption key, as described in the Dolev-Yao
model [19].
